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Many clinical neuroscience investigations have suggested that trait anxiety is associated with 
increased neural reactivity to mistakes in the form of an event-related potential called the 
error-related negativity (ERN). Two recent meta-analyses indicated that the anxiety-ERN 
association was of a small-to-medium effect size (rs =-.25 and -.28), however, these prior 
investigations did not quantitatively adjust effect sizes for publication bias. Here, in an updated 
meta-analysis (k=58, N=3819), we found support for an uncorrected effect size of r =-.19, and 
applied a range of methods to test for and correct publication bias (trim-and-fill, PET, PEESE, 
Peters’ test, three-parameter selection model). The majority of bias-correction methods 
suggested that the correlation between anxiety and the ERN is non-zero, but smaller than the 
uncorrected effect size (average adjusted effect size: r =-.12, range: r =-.05 to -.18). Moderation 
analyses also revealed more robust effects for clinical anxiety and anxious samples 
characterised by worry, whereas mixed anxiety and sub-clinical anxiety were not associated 
with the amplitude of the ERN. Our results suggest that the anxiety-ERN relationship survives 
multiple corrections for publication bias, albeit not among all sub-types and populations of 
anxiety. Nevertheless, only 50% of the studies included in our analysis reported significant 
results, indicating that future research exploring the anxiety-ERN relationship would benefit 














Assessing and adjusting for publication bias in the relationship between anxiety and the 
error-related negativity 
Safe and flexible behaviour depends on the ability to detect and compensate for mistakes. In 
addition to guiding adaptive behaviours, errors typically coincide with potential harm, including 
financial losses, embarrassment, and physical injury, meaning that errors are also 
motivationally significant (Hajcak, 2012). While mistakes are aversive for most people, error 
reactivity appears to be particularly high in clinical and subclinical forms of anxiety (Weinberg, 
Riesel, & Hajcak, 2012). Considerable support for the relationship between anxiety and error-
processing comes from clinical neuroscience investigations of an event-related potential called 
the error-related negativity (ERN; Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993). Here, we 
applied bias-correction methods to explore the extent and impact of publication bias in the 
literature supporting the anxiety-ERN relationship. 
Anxiety and the ERN 
Anxiety is a multi-faceted construct that includes cognitive aspects (e.g., worry), as well as 
bodily symptoms (e.g., physiological arousal), and avoidant behaviours (e.g., avoiding 
socialising, work, etc.). The responses that characterize anxiety can be highly adaptive—
stimulating increased attention and defensive action in response to threats (Nesse, 2005; 
Bergstrom & Meacham, 2016). However, more chronic forms of anxiety (e.g., generalized 
anxiety disorder; obsessive-compulsive disorder; social anxiety disorder) are also among the 
most prevalent and persistent mental health disorders world-wide (Baxter, Vos, Scott, Ferrari, 
& Whiteford, 2014). This significant disease-burden has prompted psychopathological research 
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exploring the neuro-cognitive underpinnings of anxiety, with one consistent finding indicating 
that enhanced neural reactivity to mistakes—in particular the amplitude of the ERN—is a 
biologically meaningful correlate of trait anxiety (Moser et al., 2013; Olvet & Hajcak, 2008; 
Weinberg, Dietrich, & Riesel, 2015). 
 The ERN is a negative-going response-locked ERP that peaks within 100ms of mistakes, 
and is putatively generated by the anterior midcingulate cortex (Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker, 
1994). The ERN possesses psychometric properties supporting its use as a measure of individual 
difference: the component is internally consistent (Olvet & Hajcak, 2009); reliable over time 
(Weinberg & Hajcak, 2011); and is heritable (Anokhin, Goloshokin, & Heath, 2008). While a 
great deal of debate has been generated regarding the exact psychological mechanisms that 
give rise to the ERN, a considerable body of evidence suggests that the component is at least 
sensitive to the motivational significance of mistakes (Hajcak, Moser, Yeung, & Simons, 2005; 
Hajcak, 2012; for a recent review see Saunders, Lin, Milyavskaya, & Inzlicht, 2017).  Most 
important for present concerns, enhanced ERN amplitudes have been reported across multiple 
forms of anxiety, including generalized anxiety disorder (Weingberg, Olvet, & Hajcak, 2010); 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD, Gehring, Himle, & Nisenson, 2000); and related individual 
differences in subclinical negative affectivity (Amodio, Master, Yee, & Taylor, 2008). These 
findings are consistent with the idea that the ERN in part reflects the increased saliency and 
personal significance of mistakes among those with varying levels of anxiety. 
The anxiety-ERN relationship persists after symptom remission (Stern et al., 2010), and 
enhanced ERN amplitudes are present in unaffected first-degree relatives of OCD patients 
(Riesel, Endrass, Kaufmann, & Kathmann, 2011). This evidence suggests that the ERN may be a 
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heritable, biologically-meaningful vulnerability marker for several forms of clinical anxiety 
(Olvet & Hajcak, 2008; Weinberg et al., 2016).  Synthesising across many of these studies, two 
recent meta-analyses (Cavanagh & Shackman, 2015; Moser, Moran, Schroder, Donnellan, & 
Yeung, 2013) supported negative small-to-medium sized correlations between trait anxiety and 
the ERN (Moser et al., 2013: r = -.25; Cavanagh & Shackman, 2015: r = -.28).  
As mentioned previously, anxiety is not a unitary construct, and it has been proposed that 
separable aspects of anxiety are differentially associated with ERN amplitude (Moser et al., 
2013). One useful distinction in the present context is between cognitive aspects of anxiety 
comprising worry and rumination, often in response to ambiguous threats (i.e., anxious 
apprehension), and somatic and physiologic features of anxiety that typically arise in reaction to 
present threat (i.e., anxious arousal). It has recently been proposed that the anxiety-ERN 
relationship might be particularly related to anxious apprehension/worry (Moser, Moran, & 
Jendrusina, 2012; Zambrano-Vazquez & Allen, 2014; however, see Gorka, Burkhouse, Afshar, & 
Phan, 2016). Supporting this suggestion, a meta-analysis by Moser et al. (2013) indicated that 
the anxiety-ERN link is largest in magnitude (r = -.35) for anxious apprehension (comprising 
OCD, generalized anxiety disorder, social anxiety disorder, and behavioural inhibition) rather 
than mixed anxiety (r = -.09), comprising a range of non-specific anxiety measures that to 
varying degrees combine anxious apprehension with anxious arousal and/or depression-related 
symptoms.  
While these findings can be interpreted to support the view that the anxiety-ERN 
relationship reflects compensatory control mechanisms linked to worry and verbal rumination 
(Moser et al., 2013), other work points to a retained role for affective, visceral, and somatic 
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contributions to anxiety related enhancement of the ERN (Hajack, 2003; Gorka et al., 2016). 
Consequently, the exact dimensions of anxiety that underlie its relationship with ERN are still 
debated, representing an important avenue for ongoing research. Here, we retain the worry-
mixed anxiety contrast to replicate an existing empirical moderation that exists within the 
meta-analytical literature on the ERN (i.e., Moser et al., 2013), while acknowledging that the 
exact psychological mechanisms underlying the anxiety-ERN relationship are outside the scope 
of the current review.  
The current study 
In the current study we applied a range of bias-correction tools to test the robustness of 
the anxiety-ERN relationship. While meta-analysis is a powerful tool to synthesise empirical 
data across studies, meta-analytic estimates are highly susceptible to common biases that exist 
in academic publishing (Rothstein, Sutton, & Borenstein, 2006). First, publication bias, also 
known as the file-drawer problem, occurs when statistically significant results enter the 
literature more frequently than null results. Second, questionable research practices (or p-
hacking) refer to cases in which researchers analyse data flexibly with the goal to reduce the p-
value below a given threshold (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). Both practices mean 
that naïve1 meta-analytical estimates can substantially overestimate the size of a given effect.  
To combat this issue, several statistical tools have been developed to assess and adjust 
for bias in published literature. Such a quantitative assessment of publication bias was never 
conducted on either of the prior meta-analyses of the anxiety-ERN relationship, leaving the 
 
1 We use the term naïve to refer to a meta-analytical effect size that does not take account of publication bias, 
rather than as a pejorative term 
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evidential value of those meta-analyses in some doubt. It is important to note that one previous 
meta-analyses did visually inspect funnel plots for evidence of publication bias, and conducted 
fail-safe N analyses to estimate how many non-significant studies would be required to nullify 
the anxiety-ERN relationship (Cavanagh & Shackman, 2015). These methods do not 
quantitatively address publication bias for two reasons. First, neither method provides an 
estimate of the underlying effect size after adjusting for publication bias. As such, while they 
might suggest that an effect would remain significant after accounting for null results, they 
provide no indication of the levels of effect size inflation attributable to publication bias. 
Second, and perhaps more critically, both methods are widely considered to be insufficiently 
conservative adjustments for publication bias (Becker, 2005; Carter, Schönbrodt, Gervais, & 
Hilgard, 2019). In light of these limitations, the primary goal of the current research was use a 
range quantitative bias-correction measures with varying levels of conservativeness to estimate 
the magnitude of the anxiety-ERN link. 
Since the completion of our analyses, two further meta-analyses have been published 
that also explored the anxiety-ERN relationship. Pasion and Barbosa (2019) conducted a meta-
analysis on internalizing psychopathology and the ERN, and included 64 studies that spanned 
Anxiety (e.g., GAD, PTSD, OCD) and depression. Overall, this analysis returned a small overall 
relationship between internalising psychopathology and the ERN (g = .08), with subsequent 
moderation analyses indicating larger associations for anxiety-related dimensions of 
internalizing psychopathology (anxiety-related: g = 0.24; OC-related, g = 0.34). In one further 
meta-analysis, Reisel (2019) included 38 studies of the ERN specifically in OCD samples, finding 
a significant association of medium effect size in response conflict tasks (g = 0.55). As with 
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Cavanagh and Shackman (2015), Reisel (2019) addressed publication-bias using methods that 
are generally not conservative enough (fail-safe N and visual inspection of funnel plots). 
However, the authors also found that effect size diminished with increasing sample sizes, 
indicating that small-study effects are potentially present in the OCD-ERN literature. Pasion and 
Barbosa (2019) provided Egger’s regression test on internalizing psychopathology overall 
(including both anxiety and depression), rather than on the relationship between anxiety and 
the ERN specifically. As such, despite at least four existing meta-analyses on the anxiety-ERN 
relationship, the field currently lacks a rigorous assessment of the extent to which publication 
bias might influence this well-researched effect.  
Given the wide interest in the anxiety-ERN relationship (as evidenced by the multiple 
existing meta-analyses), we think it is important to conduct a comprehensive assessment of 
potential bias in this literature. A skeptic would have good reason to suspect that publication 
bias might distort effect sizes in prior meta-analyses of the anxiety-ERN relationship (or any 
other uncorrected meta-analysis). Scientific careers are often advanced by regularly publishing 
(significant) findings—a factor that appears to drive (and also be driven by) the biases in 
academic publishing. Recent evidence also suggests that bias might be highly prevalent in 
studies of human neuroscience. One recent analysis of over 1119 cognitive neuroscience papers 
reported that studies typically obtained 12% power to detect small effects, and 44% power to 
detect medium-sized effects (Szucs & Ionidis, 2017, see also Button et al., 2013). These power 
analyses suggest that human neuroscience investigations should return null results more often 
than not.  However, most academic journals contain a majority of significant results. Such 
power considerations might be particularly pertinent in clinical neuroscience research where 
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practical constraints (e.g., access to patient samples) often make it very difficult to achieve the 
large samples that are necessary to quantify individual differences.  
Here, we used a range of quantitative methods to estimate the extent of publication bias 
in the literature supporting the relationship between trait anxiety and the ERN. In this process, 
we provided a range of estimates of effect size across bias-correction procedures with varying 
degrees of conservativeness.   
Method  
Our initial aim was to apply tests of publication bias to prior meta-analyses of the anxiety-
ERN relationship (Cavanagh & Shackman, 2015; Moser et al., 2013). However, we also sought 
published and unpublished studies produced since the production of these earlier meta-
analyses, resulting in a meta-analysis that is substantially larger than the previous reports. Data 
files and analysis scripts, in addition to supplementary documentation including a log of analysis 
decisions and details of the literature search are available on our open-science framework (OSF) 
page (https://osf.io/r7dvc/).  
Study selection criteria 
Primary inclusion/exclusion and study selection criteria were largely pre-determined from 
the two previous meta-analyses (Cavanagh & Shackman, 2015; Moser et al., 2013) and are 
posted in detail on our OSF page (https://osf.io/5efxa/). The prior meta-analyses overlap 
considerably in terms of topic and included studies—46% of the studies in Cavanagh & 
Shackman also appeared in Moser et al. Both previous meta-analyses defined anxiety broadly, 
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including measures of clinical and trait anxiety, as well as related dispositions (e.g., neuroticism; 
behavioural inhibition).  
Studies were included in our meta-analysis if they at least included the measure of the 
ERN on error trials, and included an operationalisation of anxiety that could was related to the 
amplitude of the ERN. In order to maintain comparison with existing meta-analyses (Moser et 
al., 2013; Cavanagh & Shackman, 2014), we exclusively included studies that used the list of 
anxiety measurements included in these two prior reviews. This inclusion criteria allowed for a 
wide-range of anxiety measures, including studies where groups were defined based on clinical 
diagnosis (e.g., generalized anxiety disorder, social anxiety disorder, obsessive compulsive 
disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder), anxiety scales (e.g., Penn State Worry Questionnaire; 
Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale; Anxiety Sensitivity Index), and a range of closely 
related individual differences (e.g., Big-5 Neuroticism, Behavioural Inhibition System Scale). 
Using only the measures used in these prior meta-analyses also meant that we closely match 
the existing analyses in scope, and, more importantly, we could operationalize key 
moderators—especially anxious apprehension/worry vs. mixed anxiety—in exactly the same 
manner as the prior investigations. Samples were not included if they focused on a clinical 
disorder besides anxiety. This is especially pertinent since co-morbid depression can mask the 
anxiety-ERN relationship (Weinberg et al., 2012).   
For our overall analyses, we also had to reconcile some key differences between the two 
prior meta-analyses. The largest difference in inclusion criteria between the previous meta-
analyses was that Moser et al. included participants with clinical diagnoses, whereas Cavanagh 
and Shackman focused on un-medicated, sub-clinical samples. In our overall analyses, we 
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included both clinical and non-clinical samples, and included clinical status as a moderator in 
our analyses (see below). Moser et al. included only studies in which the ERN was assessed in a 
conflict paradigm (e.g., Stroop, Flanker, Go/No-go) with no motivational manipulation (e.g., 
monetary incentive), whereas Cavanagh and Shackman included motivational manipulations 
and other tasks (e.g., probabilistic learning). As with Moser et al., we determined to focus solely 
on conflict paradigms with no motivational manipulations for the following reasons. First, it has 
previously been suggested that anxiety-ERN relationships are primarily present in conflict tasks 
rather than other tasks, such as probabilistic learning tasks (see Moser et al., 2013, 
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005). Interestingly, this moderation was verified by a meta-analysis that 
was published subsequent to the current analyses (Riesel, 2019). Second, we were primarily 
interested in understanding how individual differences in ERN amplitude are associated with 
individual differences in anxiety. This, we believe, is best achieved when the ERN is assessed in 
a relatively neutral context, without motivational manipulations. Indeed, it has previously been 
demonstrated that motivational manipulations might mask difference between groups, for 
example, when punishment elevates ERN amplitudes in control participants to similar levels as 
OCD groups (Endrass et al., 2010).  
Data and syntax were obtained by request from James F. Cavanagh. The analyses from 
Moser et al. (2013) were replicated independently, and verified by comparison with the forest-
plot in the original manuscript. Two effect sizes from the Moser et al. meta-analyses were 
unavailable in the original manuscripts and were estimated from the forest plot in the prior 
meta-analyses and denoted with “est.” in figure 1.   
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We aimed to locate and include relevant studies published in the years following the prior 
meta-analyses. First, we emailed all first and senior authors who had articles included in the 
prior meta-analyses asking for published and unpublished studies. This call for papers was also 
published publicly on our OSF page and shared on social media. Second, we identified further 
studies by searching first and senior author’s websites, and reading recent systematic review 
articles (e.g., Weinberg et al., 2016). Third, we conducted a PubMed search using the anxiety-
ERN relevant criteria published with the prior analyses. The PubMed search was conducted for 
a period starting in January 2012 and ending in June 2018. These searches identified 1,171 
potential manuscripts, leading to a detailed examination of 71 manuscripts, 24 of which were 
included in the subsequent meta-analyses (including 7 unpublished effect sizes). 47 of the full-
text articles that were closely examined were excluded either because they included no eligible 
measure of anxiety (11), were re-analyses of old data (10), had no usable ERN-anxiety 
relationship (7), had insufficient statistics to be included (8), included a motivational 
manipulation (3), participants were primarily recruited for a clinical disorder besides anxiety (3), 
they did not use a conflict task (2), they were a prospective study (2), or because their statistics 
were ambiguous (1). Of the unpublished effects included there was one case of clinical anxiety 
with the rest being correlational studies with volunteer, non-clinical samples. A flow chart 
depicting our search process is available online (https://osf.io/wxzjk/). 
Our primary results focused on an overall meta-analysis that incorporated the unique 
studies from Cavanagh and Shackman in addition to more recent studies into the earlier meta-
analysis by Moser et al. Analyses focusing on the Cavanagh and Shackman and Moser et al. 
studies are included in tables identified as “Cavanagh” and “Moser”, respectively. When effect 
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sizes extracted from any given study differed between the previous meta-analyses, differences 
were resolved by the first author and documented (https://osf.io/fw2pc/). The overall analyses 
included only effect sizes in which the anxiety-ERN association was measured in a conflict task 
without a motivational manipulation. Consequently, 15 effect sizes from Cavanagh and 
Shackman were excluded from the overall meta-analysis. This meant that the overall meta-
analysis is most similar to that conducted by Moser et al., yet the bias-adjusted estimates for 
the Cavanagh and Shackman studies is presented in tables 2 and 3.  
Summary characteristics of the included studies are presented in table 1, and details of 
effect size extraction available online (https://osf.io/thxws/). Half of the studies were clinical 
neuroscience investigations comparing the ERN in a clinically diagnosed anxious sample (OCD; 
generalized anxiety disorder; social anxiety disorder; post-traumatic stress disorder, PTSD) to 
healthy controls (k=29). The rest comprised non-clinical volunteer samples using various trait 
scales. The effect size relating to a scale measure that was most closely related to 
worry/anxious apprehension (cf., Moser et al., 2013) was used when multiple effect sizes were 
available.  
Pearson’s r was extracted from each study. For group comparisons the effect size was 
extracted by calculating Cohen’s d from the descriptive statistics, or from inferential statistics 






Table 1: Features of studies included in the overall meta-analysis, adapted and updated from 
Moser et al. (2013) and Cavanagh & Shackman (2015). All samples are adult (i.e., > 18 y.o.) 
unless otherwise stated.  
First Author (Year) Population Task Measure Type ERN 
Aarts (2010)a,b Volunteer Go/NoGo STAI-T M Mean 
Agam (2014) Clinical Antisaccade SCID AA Mean 
Amodio (2008)a,b Volunteer Go/NoGo BIS AA Peak 
Barker (2015) Volunteer Arrow flanker LSAS-SR  Mean 
Beste (2013)a Volunteer flanker/GoNogo ASI M Mean 
Boksem (2006)a,b Volunteer Letter flanker BIS AA Mean 
Carrasco (2013a)a Clinical - pediatric OCD Arrow flanker K-SADS-PL AA Mean  
Carrasco (2013b)a Clinical - pediatric OCD Arrow flanker K-SADS-PL AA Mean  
Cavanagh (2008)a,b Volunteer Letter flanker BIS AA Peak 
Chang (2010)a,b Volunteer Letter flanker ASR M Peak 
De Saedeleer (2018)* Volunteer Go/NoGo PSWQ AA Mean 
Elkins-Brown (2018)* Volunteer Go/NoGo  BIS AA Mean 
Endrass (2014) Clinical-OCD/SAD Arrow flanker SCID AA Peak 
Gehring (2000)a Clinical OCD Color Stroop SCID AA Mean 
Grutzmann (2016) Clinical - OCD Arrow flanker SCID AA Peak 
Hanna (2012)a Clinical -pediatric OCD Arrow flanker K-SADS-PL AA Mean 
Hanna (2016) Clinical - pediatric OCD Arrow flanker Existing 
diagnosis 
AA Mean 
Hanna (2018) Clinical – adolescent 
OCD 
Arrow flanker Arrow flanker AA Mean 
Inzlicht (2009), Study 
1a 
Volunteer Colour Stroop BIS AA Mean 
Inzlicht (2009), Study 
2a 
Volunteer Colour Stroop BFI-N M Mean 
Johannes (2001)a Clinical OCD Go/NoGo SCID AA Mean 
Kaczkurkin (2013)a Volunteer Letter flanker OCI-R AA Peak 
Klawohn (2014) Clinical - OCD Arrow flanker SCID AA Peak 
Klawohn (2016) Clinical - OCD Arrow flanker SCID AA Peak 
Ladouceur (2018) Clinical – pediatric 
anxiety 
Arrow flanker K-SADS-PL AA Mean 
Larson & Clayson 
(2011)*a 
Volunteer Arrow flanker STAI-T M Mean 
Larson (2010)* a Volunteer Colour Stroop STAI-T M Mean 
Larson (2011)* a Volunteer Arrow flanker STAI-T M Mean 
Larson (2013)* Clinical – GAD Letter flanker SCID AA Mean 
Liu (2014) Clinical – pediatric OCD Arrow flanker K-SADS-PL AA Mean 
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Lo (2017) Volunteer - child Go/NoGo RCADS-P M Mean 
Luu (2000)a,b Volunteer Letter flanker PANAS M Mean 
Meyer (2012) est. a,b Volunteer - child Arrow flanker Parent – 
SCARED 
M Mean 
Meyer (2013) Clinical - pediatric 
Anxiety 
Go/NoGo PAPA AA Mean 
Meyer (2017) Volunteer Arrow flanker STAI-T M Mean 
Milyavskaya (2018)* Volunteer Arrow flanker BIS AA Mean 
Moran (2012) est. a Volunteer Letter flanker PSWQ AA Mean 
Olvet (2009)a,b Volunteer Letter flanker DASS M Mean 
Olvet (2012)a Volunteer Arrow flanker BFI-N M Peak 
Rabinak (2013)a Clinical - PTSD Arrow flanker SCID M Mean 
Riesel (2011)a Clinical - OCD Arrow flanker SCID AA Peak 
Riesel (2014) Clinical - OCD Arrow flanker SCID AA Peak 
Riesel (2015) Clinical - OCD Arrow flanker SCID AA Peak 
Roh (2016) Clinical - OCD Face flanker  SCID AA Mean 
Roh (2017) Clinical - OCD Arrow flanker SCID AA Mean 
Santesso (2005)b Volunteer – child Letter flanker JEPQR-S M Peak 
Santesso (2006)a Volunteer - child Letter flanker CBCL AA Peak 
Santesso (2009)b Volunteer - child Letter flanker Composite M Peak 
South (2010)b Volunteer – child Arrow flanker BIS AA Mean 
Stern (2010)a Clinical - OCD Letter flanker SCID AA Mean 
Swick (2016) study 1 Clinical - PTSD Arrow flanker PCL-M M Mean 
Swick (2016) study 2 Clinical - PTSD Arrow flanker PCL-M M Mean 
Tanovic (2017) Volunteer Arrow flanker PSWQ AA Mean 
Tops (2011)a Volunteer Letter flanker BIS AA Mean 
Weinberg (2010)a Clinical - GAD Arrow flanker SCID AA Mean 
Weinberg (2012)a Clinical - GAD Arrow flanker SCID AA Mean 
Weinberg (2015) Clinical Arrow flanker SCID AA Mean 
Xiao et al. (2011)a Clinical – GAD/OCD Letter flanker Chinese MINI AA Mean 
Note: a = in Moser et al. (2013); b = in Cavanagh & Shackman (2015); * = unpublished effect size. GAD, 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder; OCD, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder; PTSD, Post-traumatic Stress 
Disorder. ASR, Achenbach Self-Report; BFI-N, Big Five Inventory-Neuroticism; BIS, Behavioral Inhibition 
System Scale; CBCL, Child Behavior Checklist; DASS, Depression Anxiety Stress Scale; JEPQR-S, Junior 
Eysenck Personality Questionnaire – Revised, Self-report; K-SADS-PL, Schedule for Affective Disorders 
and Schizophrenia for School-Age Children-Present and Lifetime Version; LSAS-SR, Leibowitz Social 
Anxiety Scale – Self-Report; MINI, Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview; PANAS, Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule; PCL-M, PTSD Checklist, Military version; PSWQ, Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire; RCADS-P, Revised Child Anxiety and Depression Scale—Parent Version; SCARED, Screen 
for Child Anxiety Related Disorders; SCID, Structured Clinical Interview for DSM Disorders; STAI-T, State 
and Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait Version. AA, Anxious Apprehension; M, Mixed Anxiety. Mean, mean 




Analyses were conducted using the metafor package (Viechtbauer, 2010) in R. Random-
effects meta-analyses were chosen because they are more appropriate for studies sampled 
from heterogeneous populations. Pearson’s r is often not normally distributed, therefore, effect 
sizes were transformed onto the Fisher’s Z-scale using esclac. The random-effects meta-analysis 
was conducted using a restricted maximum likelihood estimation. Z-scores were converted into 
Pearson’s r for summary statistics/figures. Finally, we only included cases where effect sizes 
were could be verified as arising from independent samples. As such, any chases where two or 
more effect sizes come from one publication (e.g., Swick, Honzel, & Turken, 2016), we were 
careful to ensure that the effect sizes came from different populations. In cases where two 
eligible clinical groups (e.g., obsessive compulsive disorder and social anxiety disorder; Endrass, 
Riesel, Kathmann, & Buhlmann, 2014) shared a common control group, we pooled mean and 
standard-deviations to form one clinical group to compare with the control.  
Meta-regression was used to assess moderation by the following study characteristics:  
1.  Anxiety-type. Moser et al. reported that the anxiety-ERN relationship is larger in 
anxious samples characterised by worry and verbal rumination about threat (i.e., 
anxious apprehension) compared to samples characterised by a mix of worry, 
physiological symptoms, and depressive symptoms (i.e., mixed anxiety). 
Consequently, we included anxiety-type (worry vs. mixed) as a moderator to replicate 
this prior investigation. 
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2. Clinical status. As half of the studies in our analyses included samples with a diagnosis 
of clinical anxiety, we included clinical status (clinical vs. volunteer) as a moderator. 
3. Publication status. We tested for a difference in effect size between published and 
unpublished studies to assess publication bias. 
4. Developmental stage. Since the ERN, and the frontal cortex more broadly, develops 
throughout the lifespan (cf., Tamnes, Walhovd, Torstveit, Sells, & Fjell, 2013), we 
included developmental stage (child vs. adult sample) as a categorical moderator of 
the anxiety-ERN relationship.  
5. ERN quantification. We also included the method used to operationalize the ERN 
(peak amplitude vs. mean amplitude) as a categorical predictor of the anxiety-ERN 
relationship. This moderator analysis was conducted since differences in reliability 
might exist between studies using mean and peak measurements (Fischer, Klein, & 
Ullsperger, 2016).   
Tests of publication bias 
Small study effects occur when smaller studies over-estimate the size of an association or 
treatment effect. These effects often indicate publication bias, where only studies that 
overestimate the true underlying effect size generate “publishable” p-values. Multiple methods 
have been used to assess and correct for publication bias in existing literatures. While a great 
deal of debate exists concerning the most appropriate bias correction techniques—often 
concerning the conservativeness of the adjustment—we opted to report multiple correction 
methods. This strategy was chosen to present a range of possible corrected effect sizes with 
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varying levels of conservativeness, and also so that these adjusted effect sizes are available for 
future researchers interested in specific bias adjustments.   
We first tested for small study effects using funnel plots (standard error against effect 
size). These plots should form a symmetrical funnel/triangle shape under conditions of low 
publication bias, with more variability in effect sizes for studies with high standard errors 
compared to more precise studies with low standard errors. Funnel-plot asymmetry is 
indicative of publication bias. One previous meta-analysis included funnel plots to visually 
inspect for possible publication bias (Cavanagh & Shackman, 2015), however, this analysis did 
not report any quantitative correction for bias. In our study we quantified asymmetry using 
Egger’s tests (regtest in metafor). Trim-and-fill analyses were used to correct the meta-
analytical estimate by imputing missing studies needed to make the funnel plot symmetrical 
(trimfill in metafor).  
Trim-and-fill often under-corrects for small study effects (see Carter et al., 2019). 
Therefore, we additionally used a range of regression-based methods that provide more 
conservative bias corrections. These methods follow a simple logic in which a weighted-least 
squares regression is used to predict effect size from a measure of study precision. The 
intercept of this model is taken to be the most precise possible study, and, therefore, an 
unbiased assessment of the underlying effect. A significant slope indicates publication bias if 
increasing precision predicts decreasing effect size. In PET effect sizes are predicted from their 
standard errors, weighted by the inverse of the variances. PEESE is similar to PET, but instead 
uses a quadratic equation that allows for the assumption that studies with larger standard 
errors will systematically overestimate the underlying effect size more so than more precise 
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studies. PET has a general tendency to over-correct small study effects (Inzlicht, Gervais, & 
Berkman, 2015). Thus, a conditional logic has been suggested where PET is first used to 
establish if the corrected effect size is non-zero, followed by PEESE to provide an estimate of 
the underlying effect (Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014). This conditional logic remains 
controversial, and here we report both measures, while acknowledging that PET is likely the 
more conservative estimate. The final—and perhaps most literal—test of small study effects 
used in this analysis was the Peter’s test in which study effect sizes are predicted by the inverse 
of sample sizes, weighted by sample size (Peters, Sutton, Jones, Abrams, & Rushton, 2006).  
Lastly, we used the three-parameter selection model. Selection models are weight 
functions that aim to explicitly model the process through which results are either published or 
suppressed due to publication bias. Recently endorsed by two simulation papers as a powerful 
method to correct for publication bias (McShane et al., 2016; Carter et al., 2019), the selection 
method we used has three parameters: the population effect size μ; heterogeneity of effect 
size τ2; and the probability of a null result being published. We estimated this model using the 
weightr function and report the adjusted effect size and the likelihood ratio test which provides 
a χ2 statistic comparing the unadjusted and adjusted effect-size estimates.  
Results 
Random effects meta-analysis 
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The overall meta-analysis returned a significant negative correlation between anxiety and 
the ERN (r=-.19, p<.001, see Figure 1 and table 1)2. The influence function in metafor did not 
indicate that any individual study over-influenced the results. This analysis also showed 
significant heterogeneity, Q(57)=121.63, p< .001, with  I2=52.5% suggesting a medium amount 
of variation between studies due to heterogeneity rather than chance (Pigott, 2012).  
Anxiety-type (worry vs. mixed anxiety) significantly moderated the meta-analytical effect 
size, Q(1)=6.12, p=.013, due to a significant relationship between worry and the ERN, r = -.22, 
but not between mixed anxiety and the ERN, r = -.10. Clinical status was also a significant 
moderator, Q(1)=4.50, p= 0.03, due to larger effects in studies with clinical populations, r=-.23, 






2 A negative deflection is also observed on correct trials, the Correct Related Negativity (CRN). We found a small 
negative relationship between anxiety and the CRN, r =-.10, 95% CIs [-.14,-.06], k=40, p<.001. Moderation analyses 
also indicated that the CRN-Anxiety relationship was larger for peak-detection methods than mean amplitude, and 
that the CRN-Anxiety relationship was significant under trim-and-fill,PEESE, and the selection model (see 
https://osf.io/x8d3c/). These findings are consistent with the idea that anxiety might increase monitoring on both 
correct and incorrect trials, however, it is important to note that the CRN-Anxiety relationship appears to be 
smaller in magnitude than the anxiety-ERN relationship. In addition to the CRN, we also investigated the ΔERN (i.e., 
ERN minus CRN) that shows the extent to which performance monitoring differentiates between error and correct 
performance. In an overall analysis, we observed a small negative association between ΔERN and anxiety, r = -.109, 
p =.0029, k = 20, N = 1381, however, this effect only remained significant after bias-correction using trim-and-fill, 
but not with any other method. Finally, as with the ERN, we also observed moderation of the anxiety-ΔERN 




Table 2: Naïve estimates of effect-size from random-effects meta-analysis 
Meta-analysis k N r Q I2 
Overall 58 3819 -.19 [-.24,-.14] 121.63 52.5% [36.1,74.5] 
Worry 39 2792 -.22 [-.27,-.17] 60.45 34.2% [5.5,68.4] 
Mixed 19 1027 -.10 [-.21,.02]  51.74 65.6% [36.1,84.6] 
Clinical 29 2117 -.23 [-.27,-.18] 32.52 8.6%   [0.0,63.4] 
Volunteer 29 1702 -.15 [-.23,-.06] 78.07 65.8% [44.0,83.4] 
Published 51 2942 -.22 [-.27,-.17] 90.31 41.1% [23.1,71.8] 
Unpublished 7 877 -0.03 [-.11,.05]    8.97 18.8% [0.00,92.3] 
Moser 32 1706 -.24 [-.32,-.16] 84.64 63.1% [44.7,83.8] 
Cavanagh 28 942 -.29 [-.38,-.19] 59.48 55.9% [30.8,80.3] 
Note: k = number of studies; N = summed N across studies; r = Pearson’s r; Q = test for 
heterogeneity, I2 = variation across studies due to heterogeneity. Square brackets contain 95% 
CIs. Bold = p<.05. 
 
As 68% of the effect sizes classified as worry were clinically anxious, we tested if the 
anxiety-type moderation holds when focusing separately on only clinical or volunteer samples. 
We found no significant moderation by anxiety-type when comparing worry (k=13) with mixed 
anxiety (k=16) in volunteers, Q(1)=0.65, p=.42. However, worry did moderate the anxiety-ERN 
relationship when analyses were restricted to clinical samples, Q(1)=4.09, p=.04, due to a larger 
effect size for clinical groups with worry, r=-.24, k=26, p<.001, than clinical groups with mixed 
anxiety, r=.0005, k=3, p=.997. These subsample analyses suggest that the most robust Anxiety-
ERN relationships are observed in clinical samples with worry (OCD, social anxiety disorder, 
generalised anxiety disorder). However, both the moderation by anxiety-type and clinical status 
should be interpreted with caution for a number of reasons, including their relatively high p-
values, and the small number of clinical samples with mixed anxiety (all three were PTSD 
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samples). In light of these moderation analyses, subsequent bias-corrections are provided for 
the overall meta-analysis, and for separate subsets split by anxiety-type and clinical status.  
Finally, we found significant moderation by publication status, Q(1)=9.79, p=.0018, due to 
larger effect sizes occurring in published, r=-.22, relative to unpublished work that did not differ 
from zero, r=-.03. It is important to note that the unpublished data included a higher proportion 
of volunteer samples and mixed anxiety than the overall analysis. As volunteer samples and 
mixed anxiety were both associated with smaller effect sizes, it is possible that the moderation 
by publication status is not fully explained by publication status. However, it is important to 
note that the one clinical study included explored general anxiety disorder with a larger sample 
(n = 273) than average sample size (Larson, 2013*), so this study did fail to replicate the 





Figure 1: Forest plot of correlation coefficients anxiety and ERN amplitude. Error-bars depict 




Quantitative corrections for publication bias.   
Egger’s regression test did not support significant funnel-plot asymmetry, Z=-1.72, p=.085. 
Subsequent trim-and-fill analyses suggested four additional studies were required to make the 
funnel-plot symmetrical (see Figure 2). These imputed values reduced the meta-analytical 
effect size, r =-.18, p<.001, 95% CIs [-0.23, -0.13]. Trim-and-fill returned a significant meta-
analytical effect size for all sub-analyses except mixed anxiety (see table 2 and Figure 2).  
A contour-enhanced funnel plot was used to explore the distribution of effects across 
different significance thresholds. Here, publication bias would occur if studies cluster around 
conventional significance thresholds (i.e., p<.05>.01) with few null results. As figure 2 
illustrates, 57% of the results included in overall meta-analysis were null results, this 
percentage decreased to 53% if unpublished effect sizes are removed. These numbers suggest 
that a decent proportion of null results on the relationship between anxiety and the ERN do 
enter the published literature, suggesting a minimal effects for publication bias in this 
literature. Here, it should be noted that this analysis also includes the 7 unpublished studies 
that were solicited for this meta-analysis.  
We next conducted PET, Peters’, and PEESE analyses. These analyses are summarised 
comprehensively in table 2. First, it should be noted that the slopes for PET and Peters’ tests 
were both significant for the overall analysis (PET, b = -1.11, S.E. = 0.53, p = .04; Peters’, b = -4.30, 
S.E. = 2.09, p = .04). Largely similar results were found for PEESE, although the slope was not 
significant, b = -3.53, S.E. = 1.78, p =.05. Together, these results are consistent with the 
suggestion that modest small study effects are present in the anxiety-ERN relationship, partly 
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contrary to what is suggested in the funnel plots and the Egger’s test/trim-and fill. This would 
largely be anticipated for these tests, where PET-PEESE, for example, is widely assumed to 





Figure 2: Upper-left: funnel plot showing the original studies (black) and studies imputed by 
trim-and-fill analyses (orange). Upper-right: contour-enhanced funnel plot: studies in the gray 
area p >.05; studies in the red area have p <.05 and >.01; studies in the yellow area p <.01 and 
>.005; and studies in the white/background p <.005. Middle: meta-analytical effect sizes across 
the full range of estimation methods for the overall analyses, worry and mixed-anxiety 
subsamples. Lower: effect sizes across estimation methods for the clinical and volunteer 
subsamples. Error-bars depict 95% CIs.  
 
We next turned our attention to the bias-corrected effect sizes obtained from the 
intercept value of these tests as an assessment of the attenuation of the Anxiety-ERN 
relationship. In the overall analysis, the intercept was significant for both the Peters’, b0 =-.11, 
S.E. =0.04, p=.007, 95% CIs [-0.19, -0.03], and PEESE, b0 =-.12, S.E. =0.04, p=.002, 95% CIs [-.19, -
.05] tests, suggesting a small, non-zero relationship between trait-anxiety and the ERN (see 
figure 2 and table 2). The three parameter selection model also suggested that there was a 
small difference between bias-adjusted effect size, r =-.14, p<.001, 95% CIs [-.20, -.06], and the 
unadjusted effect size (r =-.19), χ2 (1) =3.81, p =.05. In contrast, the intercept value for PET was 
not statistically significant, b0 =-0.05, S.E. =0.07. p=.51, 95% CIs [-.18, .09], meaning that the PET 
analysis was the only bias-correction test to suggest that the magnitude of the anxiety-ERN 
relationship was not distinguishable from zero. Many of these bias correction tests produced 
similar intercept values to the overall analyses for the Moser and Cavanagh data-sets, but were 
not statistically significant. Here, it is difficult to know if this is entirely due to differences in 
levels of bias or statistical power in the smaller data-sets associated with the smaller number of 
effect sizes contributing to these sub-analyses.  
 In summary, with the exception of PET, each of these bias-correction effects returned a 
small but non-zero effect size for the anxiety-ERN relationship that ranged from r =-.11 to r =-
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.14. These point estimates are lower than previous uncorrected meta-analyses presented by 
Moser et al. (2013, r = -.25, 95% CIs [-.30, -.20) and Cavanagh and Shackman (2015; r = -.28, 
95%CIs [-.19,-.40]). However, the smallest estimate of effect size provided by the 95% CIs of 
each previous meta-analysis (~ r = -.20) overlap, if only slightly, with the largest effect size from 
each of our bias correction methods (range r = -.23 to -.18). Thus, our effect sizes are consistent 
with the range presented in previous analyses, albeit with most of the plausible effect sizes 
estimated from our analyses being lower in magnitude.  
Finally, in relation to the interpretation of our overall results, it is important to note that a 
conditional logic has been applied to PET-PEESE analyses, where if PET is significant, it is 
suggested to use PEESE to estimate the effect size. Otherwise, it is recommended that the 
effect size is estimated using PET. Thus, the logic of PET-PEESE would suggest that our overall 
effect size and all sub-set analyses are not different from zero. However, as we have already 










Table 2: Bias-correction statistics across methods and subsets. Adjusted r shows the bias-
corrected meta-analytical effect size for each correction method.  
 Overall  Worry Mixed Clinical Volunteer Moser   Cavanagh  
        
adjusted r        
Trim&Fill -.18 -.18 -.10 -.20 -.12 -.22 -.29 
PET b0 -.05 .01 -.06 -.08 .05 -.04 -.05 
PEESE b0 -.12 -.12 -.09 -.16 -.04 -.14 -.16 
Peters’ b0 -.11 -.10 -.09 -.15 -.03 -.13  -.14 
Selection -.14 
 
-.14 n.a. -.18 -.13 -.08 -.15 
Mean  
adjusted r 
-.12 -.11 -.09 -.15 -.06 -.12 -.16 
        
bias-estimate        
Egger’s Test  -1.72 -3.81 0.24 -2.42 -1.10 -1.36 -1.48 
PET b1 -1.11 -1.93 -0.23 -1.32 -1.31 -1.32 -1.31 
PEESE b1 -3.53 -6.03 -0.19 -4.21 -4.15 -3.85 -3.47 
Peters’ b1 -4.30 -7.57 -0.22 -5.39 -4.81 -4.92 -4.44 
Selection χ2 3.81 7.05  4.23 0.04 10.84 5.24 
Note: bold = p<.05. Egger’s test = Z-statistic. Selection = three-parameter selection model. 
Selection χ2 = Likelihood ratio test comparing unadjusted and adjusted effect size estimates. 
 
Bias-correction in sub-groups revealed by moderation analyses  
We next turned our attention to the significant moderation observed both by anxiety sub-
type (i.e., worry vs. mixed anxiety) and clinical-status (i.e., clinical vs. non-clinical studies). 
Estimates from the selection method was not provided for the mixed analyses because the p-
value interval contained too few values to create reliable estimates.  
It is important to note that more significant indicators of publication bias/small study 
effects were observed in sub-groups associated with larger effect sizes (e.g., clinical groups, 
worry) than sub-groups of studies associated with smaller effect sizes (e.g., non-clinical groups, 
mixed anxiety). Indeed, every test of potential publication bias were statistically significant for 
both the worry and clinical sub-analyses.  For the Worry sub-analyses, the Egger’s test, and the 
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slopes from PET, PEESE, and Peter’s test all returned p-values < .001, and the likelihood ratio 
test from the three-parameter selection model was significant at the 1% level, Χ2(1) = 7.05, p = 
0.008. These findings suggest that evidence for small study bias is relatively robust within the 
Worry sub-analysis. The same tests for the clinical sub-analysis were all significant at the 5% 
level (Egger’s test, p =.02; PET, p =.02; PEESE, p =.02; Peters’, p =.02; and three-parameter 
selection model Χ2(1), p = .04). 
It is interesting to consider the specificity of the relationships between worry and the ERN 
in light of these apparent small-study effects. In a previous meta-analysis (Moser et al., 2013), 
worry (i.e., anxious apprehension) showed a particularly strong association with ERN amplitude, 
r = -.35, k = 20, 95% CIs [-.40,-.29]. The uncorrected effect size from our random effects meta-
analysis for the worry studies was already lower than the previous estimate, r -.22, k = 39, 95% 
CIs [-.27,-.17], providing initial evidence that the specific worry-ERN relationship might be 
smaller than previously thought. However, this smaller effect size was further reduced by each 
of our bias-correction methods (see table 2). For example, the three-parameter selection 
method returned an effect size for the worry-ERN less than half the size of the earlier meta-
analysis, r = .14, 95% CIs [-.21, -.08]. Furthermore, the size of the average worry-ERN 
relationship observed across all bias correction methods, r = -.11, was largely similar to the 
same metric observed for the mixed anxiety-ERN relationship, r = -.09. Thus, while our results 
replicated the moderation of the anxiety-ERN relationship by subtype of anxiety, our bias-
corrected effect sizes suggested that this moderation is largely attenuated after correction for 




Discussion    
Our uncorrected meta-analysis indicated a small negative correlation between trait 
anxiety and the ERN (r =-.19), with moderator analyses further indicating that the anxiety-ERN 
relationship was present in worry but not mixed anxiety (see also Moser et al., 2013), and was 
larger in samples identified by clinical diagnosis rather than in non-clinical volunteer groups. We 
also found evidence for publication bias. First, while published studies were associated with a 
statistically significant effect size (r = -.22), the meta-analytical effect size for unpublished 
studies was not distinguishable from zero (r = -.03).  Second, 40% of the statistical tests of 
publication bias were significant in the overall meta-analysis (PET and Peters’ test), and every 
bias test (PET, PEESE, Peters’, Egger’s test, selection model Χ2) was significant for both the 
worry and clinical subsamples of studies. These findings are consistent with the presence of 
publication bias in the literature supporting a link between anxiety and the ERN.  
We also provided a range of estimates of effect size after correction for potential bias. 
Effect sizes were generally smaller but non-zero after bias correction. However, the extent of 
effect size attenuation in the overall analysis ranged from relatively trivial (trim-and-fill, r = -
.18), to more modest reductions (three-parameter selection method, r = -.14), to the complete 
abolition of the relationship between anxiety and the ERN (PET, r = .05). Here, it is noteworthy 
that the confidence intervals from the uncorrected meta-analytic effect overlapped with each 
corrected effect size, suggesting that, while effect sizes were attenuated by correction for 
publication bias, the range of plausible ‘true’ effect sizes were overlapping across analyses.  
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The same analyses on specific sub-groups of studies revealed that indicators of 
publication bias and effect size attenuation was particularly pronounced for the sub-selection 
of studies identified as anxious apprehension (i.e., worry), where both the uncorrected random 
effects meta-analysis (r = -.22) and the average of the bias-corrected estimates (r = -.11) were 
significantly smaller (i.e., 95% CIs did not overlap) than the corresponding effect size from one 
previous meta-analysis (r = -.35; see Moser et al., 2013). Expressed in terms of variance 
explained, while previous estimates indicated that worry and the ERN share 12.3% variance, our 
uncorrected effect size reduces the same statistic to 4.8%, with the average of our bias-
corrected effect sizes reducing shared variance to only 1.1%. These effects point to less close 
coupling between anxious apprehension and the ERN than previously thought, with 
implications for theory that we will return to in a subsequent section.  
When regarding our results, a reader might worry which of our range of effect sizes they 
should take as most reflective of the anxiety-ERN relationship. If only one of these outcomes 
reflects the true underlying effect, which estimate should we trust? This is indeed a significant 
challenge that is yet to be fully addressed methodologically (see Carter et al., 2019 for 
discussion). Nevertheless, it is important to note that there is a considerable degree of overlap 
among our bias correction methods, with the exception of the PET analyses that supported a 
null association between anxiety and the ERN on every occasion. Instead of considering these 
tests as definitively isolating the true effect, these bias-correction tools are perhaps better 
viewed as providing a range of plausible values under different levels of conservativeness. 
Consequently, the trim-and-fill results might be considered the least conservative bias-
corrected estimate, while PET is most conservative—perhaps to a fault (Inzlicht et al., 2015). 
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Partly contradicting the conservativeness of PET, recent simulation studies have suggested that 
both PET-PEESE and the three-parameter selection model perform adequately well under 
conditions with moderate levels of publication bias and heterogeneity, particularly when, as in 
our case, k approaches 60 (Carter et al., 2019). However, in these simulations the three-
parameter model tended to outperform PET-PEESE in the majority of cases, and, as such,  the 
effect size estimates from the selection (r = -.14) model might appropriately guide future 
theorising and empirical investigation on the anxiety-ERN relationship.   
One positive message from our analysis is that the majority of our results point to a 
significant, albeit small, relationship between anxiety and the ERN. These bias correction results 
stand in contrast to other bias-corrected meta-analyses in which effects became 
indistinguishable from zero after correction for publication bias (e.g., ego-depletion: Carter, 
Kofler, Forster, & McCullough, 2015). This positive news for the field coheres with recent meta-
scientific investigations which indicated that studies published in three major psychophysiology 
journals (Psychophysiology; International Journal of Psychophysiology; Journal of 
Psychophysiology) showed good evidential value and relatively low evidence for selective 
reporting (Carbine, Lindsey, Rodeback, & Larson, 2019).  
Theoretical implications 
While our results suggest that the anxiety-ERN relationship is likely non-zero, the 
attenuation of effect sizes observed in our study relative to other investigations prompts 
deeper consideration of effect size in relation to theory. The ERN has been implicated in the 
pathogenesis of anxiety (Meyer, 2017), and has been identified as a candidate trait vulnerability 
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marker for clinical anxiety (Olvet & Hajcak, 2008; Weinberg et al., 2016). According to these 
hypotheses, the ERN need not be continuously related to anxious symptomatology. These 
theories would predict that the ERN should be enhanced in clinical samples, and that this 
enhancement should make the individual more susceptible to future anxious psychopathology. 
In our view, the meaningfulness of the ERN is a trait-like vulnerability marker for clinically 
significant anxiety must be bounded by the strength of the relationship between the ERN and 
anxiety. If clinical anxiety only explains 2% variance in ERN amplitude (i.e., as suggested by the 
average of our corrected effect sizes, r = -.15), this small effect size would limit the extent to 
which the ERN could play a role in the aetiology of anxious psychopathology, for example, by 
predicting the onset of anxious symptoms longitudinally. Here, it is important to note that 
vulnerability to heterogeneous disorders is likely multifaceted, and it could also be argued that 
explaining a small portion of a complex problem has utility. However, it is clear that ongoing 
theoretical framing should closely consider effect size when linking the ERN to the development 
of clinical anxiety.  
 The significant moderations observed in our analyses are also of theoretic importance. 
First, we found no significant relationship between the amplitude of the ERN and studies 
classified as mixed anxiety. While previous meta-analyses found a small yet significant 
relationship between mixed anxiety and the ERN (Moser et al., 2013), this relationship was not 
even significant in our uncorrected meta-analysis (r = -.10, n = 1027). One particularly salient 
explanation for the low association observed might come from the broader symptom and trait 
profile associated with measures that are used in studies classified as mixed anxiety. For 
example, the STAI-T includes items tapping anxiety “I feel nervous and restless” and “I am calm, 
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cool, and collected” (reverse-coded), as well as depression “I feel like a failure”, “I wish I could 
be as happy as others seem to be” (Spielberger, 1989). Similarly, Big-5 neuroticism includes 
characteristics such as “worries a lot”, “can be tense”, as well as “is depressed, blue”, can be 
moody” (cf., John & Srivastava, 1999). As previous studies have indicated that the presence of 
depressive symptoms can blunt the anxiety-ERN relationship (Weinberg, Klein, & Hajcak, 2012), 
it is possible that the relatively broad profile of mixed anxiety—blending worry and anxious 
arousal with depressive symptoms and general discontent—might provide a more confounded 
test of the anxiety-ERN relationship.  
We also found that studies in which groups were identified by clinical diagnosis showed 
significantly larger effect sizes than groups with non-clinical volunteer samples. This finding 
could suggest a role for clinical status/symptom severity in the anxiety-ERN relationship. 
However, while clinical status and worry are theoretically dissociable, in our sample 66.7% of 
the effect sizes classified as worry were also clinical samples, while only 15.8% of the mixed 
anxiety effect sizes were from clinical samples (all PTSD). Consequently, the clinical-volunteer 
and worry-mixed contrasts are highly confounded. While we cannot rule out severity as a 
potential moderator of the anxiety-ERN relationship, it is also possible that the clinical diagnosis 
that are more prevalent in our analyses (e.g., OCD, GAD) are more discrete examples of anxiety 
than the broader profile of negative affectivity (e.g., covering anxiety and depression) that is 
represented in the mixed anxiety sub-sample that made up the majority of the volunteer 
samples. Further speaking against a role of symptom severity per se in explaining the anxiety-
ERN relationship, enhanced ERNs remain evident in clinically anxious samples after symptom 
remission (Stern et al., 2010) and are visible in asymptomatic relatives (Riesel et al., 2011). 
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Thus, it is tentatively more likely that the anxiety-ERN relationship differs between qualitatively 
different dimensions that underlie anxiety, rather than as a function of symptom severity.   
The observed moderations should be interpreted cautiously given that both those studies 
focused on worry and those that defined their groups by clinical diagnoses were accompanied 
by significant indicators of publication bias, and, resultantly, bias-corrected attenuation of their 
effect sizes. For example, while the uncorrected effect sizes for the worry-mixed contrast 
differed meaningfully (r = -.22 vs. r = -.10, for worry and mixed anxiety, respectively), the 
average of the effect sizes after bias-correction was similar for worry (r = -.11) and mixed 
anxiety (r = -.09). The gap between average corrected effect sizes was slightly larger between 
clinical (r = -.15) and volunteer (r  = -.06) samples. Thus, while the worry-ERN relationship was 
broadly non-zero after correction for publication bias—as was not the case for mixed anxiety—
the magnitude of corrected effect sizes between subgroups was broadly similar. It is 
noteworthy that larger samples sizes contributed to the worry subset (n = 2792, k = 39) than 
mixed anxiety (n = 1027, k = 19), meaning that differences in statistical power could explain why 
small, yet significant effects were observed for one sample (i.e., worry) but not the other (i.e., 
mixed). In contrast to a view that the anxiety-ERN relationship depends on specific dimensions 
that cut across diagnoses (e.g., worry), the asymmetry in bias between worry and mixed 
anxiety, in addition to an asymmetry in statistical power, raises the possibility that the anxiety-
ERN relationship is relatively general and non-specific, and that the moderation by worry arises 
instead from publication bias.  
To summarise our theoretical points, our data point to a potential impasse in the 
literature that could be addressed with further investigation.  On the one hand, our results 
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point to a small significant relationship between anxiety and the ERN; an effect that is most 
pronounced for clinical studies and worry. The observed moderation is potentially due to the 
more specific operationalization of anxiety in the worry/clinical studies, compared to the 
broader conceptualisation of anxiety that characterizes mixed anxiety (e.g., including 
depression, negative affect), or because anxious apprehension is a particular driver of the 
anxiety-ERN relationship (Moser et al., 2012; Moser et al., 2013), or both.  However, the higher 
evidence from publication bias, and subsequent attenuation of effect sizes, observed for 
subsamples with larger effect sizes (worry, clinical) make it difficult to tell if these studies have 
genuinely larger effects, or if these moderations are a relatively spurious result of an 
asymmetry in publication bias between the different categories of studies that formed our 
moderation analyses. To our knowledge, these questions cannot be addressed meta-
analytically. Instead, new statistically powerful empirical investigations are required to 
disentangle the relationship between the ERN and various dimensions that underlie anxious 
psychopathology (e.g., Gorka et al., 2016).  
Limitations and Future Directions 
Our results can also be interpreted to provide practical guidance for ongoing studies of 
the anxiety-ERN relationship. First, the range of effect sizes across subgroups of our analyses 
could be used to conduct apriori power analyses for ongoing investigations. At a practical 
empirical level, our results suggest that future studies would need to test at least 162 
participants to achieve 80% power for a one-tailed of the uncorrected overall meta-analytical 
effect size, over 335 participants for the same test with the corrected effect size returned by 
the selection model (r =-.14), and over 440 participants when using the average of the 
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corrected effect sizes (r = -.12). Similar large numbers of participants would be required to test 
the ERN-Anxiety relationship even for those sub-analyses that tended to return larger meta-
analytical effect sizes (i.e., worry and clinical anxiety). The average sample size in our analyses 
was 68.8; despite this sample size being larger than typical ERP investigations, our results 
suggest that ongoing research would benefit from increased sample sizes when studying the 
anxiety-ERN relationship. 
Several limitations should be noted when interpreting our results. First, while we coded 
for a range of categorical moderators, future studies could advance the field by coding of 
continuous and categorical moderators of the anxiety-ERN relationship. The ERN-anxiety 
relationship is putatively moderated by sex (Moran et al., 2016) and comorbid depressive 
symptoms (Weinberg et al., 2012), and the ERN has also been implicated in the developmental 
trajectory of anxiety (Meyer, 2017). Consequently, future studies might benefit from taking 
more nuanced and statistically powerful approaches to coding moderators. For example, while 
we coded age as a binary categorical variable (child vs. adult), future studies could take a more 
continuous approach to coding age to investigate the anxiety-ERN relationship over the lifespan 
(from infancy to adulthood to older age). However, it should be noted that our reading of the 
literature suggests that there is a lack of studies assessing the anxiety-ERN relationship, 
particularly into older age. Critically, then, addressing the lifespan trajectory of the anxiety-ERN 
relationship not only depends on changing the  coding of a moderator, but also on further 
future studies plugging gaps in the literature.  
Clinical and sub-clinical anxiety are highly comorbid with depressive symptoms (Brady & 
Kendall, 1992), and this comorbidity is undoubtedly present in our samples.  As such, our 
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conclusions are limited to anxiety without partialling out variance attributable to comorbid 
depressive symptoms—this was largely unavoidable due to the nature of anxiety measurement 
in most studies of the anxiety-ERN relationship. Here, it should be noted that while we suspect 
that comorbidity of depressive symptoms/negative affect is particularly problematic for the 
studies classified as mixed anxiety, it is nevertheless also true that studies classified as worry 
would also contain considerable comorbidity. Thus, while our analyses do reflect the broader 
anxiety-ERN literature, future meta-analyses might benefit from controlling for depressive 
symptoms if this becomes possible with sufficient reporting of comorbidity in ongoing 
investigations.  
Conclusion 
Our results suggested that there is a detectable relationship between anxiety and the ERN 
after many controls for publication bias, but that the magnitude of this effect is—perhaps 
considerably—smaller than suggested by previous estimates (average adjusted effect size: r =-
.12). Our results also suggest that the most reliable relationships between anxiety and the ERN 
are observed in clinical studies and anxious samples characterised by worry, while we observed 
no significant relationship between mixed anxiety and the ERN. However, it should be noted 
that the subsamples with the largest effect sizes (worry, clinical anxiety) also demonstrated the 
greatest evidence for publication bias, and resulting attenuations of effect sizes. These results 
suggest that on-going research should increase statistical power—likely by increasing sample 
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